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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: HOUSING PART F
___________________________________________
ESPLANADE GARDENS INC.
Petitioner,
-against-

Index No. 71477/19
DECISION/ORDER
Motion Sequence Nos. 1 and 2

DANIELLE GILL ET AL
Respondent.
____________________________________________
HON KAREN MAY BACDAYAN, JHC
Guttman Mintz Baker & Sonnenfeldt, PC (Angelo Ficarrotta, Esq.), for the petitioner
New York Legal Assistance Group (Kaitlyn May Filzer, Esq.), for the respondent
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219 (a) of the papers considered in review of this motion by
NYSCEF Doc No:
Papers

NYSCEF Doc Nos.

Petitioner’s motion seq. 1 and affidavits in support
Petitioner’s exhibits 1-10
Respondent’s opposition and cross-motion (seq. 2)
and affidavits in support
Respondent’s exhibits A-G
Petitioner’s opposition and reply and supporting documents
Respondent’s reply and annexed exhibits

1-7
8-17
19-21
22-28
30-34
36-38

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
This is a licensee holdover brought against the daughter of the shareholder in a limited
income housing cooperative, Danielle Gill (“respondent”). Petitioner has moved for summary
judgment based on a Department of Housing, Preservation and Development (“HPD”)
determination. that found that respondent is not entitled to succession of her mother’s shares and
cooperative apartment. This determination, made upon review of documentary evidence, was
upheld on appeal as having a rational basis. (Gill v New York City Dep’t of Housing Preservation
and Development, et al, Sup Ct, New York County, Sept. 28, 2019, Wan, J., index No.
101110/18.)

Petitioner moves to strike respondents defenses and counterclaims and for summary
judgment and use and occupancy. (NYSCEF Doc No. 5, motion sequence 1.) Petitioner argues
that respondent is a licensee whose license expired with “the departure of the prior shareholder
of record” and that, as this decision was upheld by the supreme court, respondent’s succession
rights cannot be re-litigated in housing court. Petitioner believes that Cheryl Gill permanently
vacated the premises in 2013 after purchasing a home in New Jersey and that the proceeding is
not her primary residence. (NYSCEF Doc No. 6, petitioner’s attorney’s affirmation in support ¶
11; NYSCEF Doc No. 13, petitioner’s exhibit 6, certificate of eviction.)
Respondent cross-moves for summary judgment and dismissal of the petition pursuant to
CPLR 3211 (a) (7) as petitioner has no cause of action against respondent, and pursuant to CPLR
3211 (a) (10) on the basis that Cheryl Gill, the holder of the shares to the apartment is a
necessary party to the proceeding without whom full relief cannot be granted. Respondent states
unequivocally that she is no longer claiming succession rights to the cooperative apartment.
(NYSCEF Doc No. 20, respondent’s attorney’s affirmation ¶ 20.) Indeed, respondent’s answer
asserts no claim to succession. Respondent further defends that Cheryl Gill has “not vacated or
surrendered her interest in the subject apartment . . . nor has there been a termination of the
shareholder of record’s tenancy.” (NYSCEF Doc No. 26, respondents exhibit E, verified answer
¶¶ 17-18.)
It is not disputed that in January 2009, respondent’s mother, Cheryl Gill, purchased 66
shares of stock in Esplanade Gardens, Inc. (NYSCEF Doc No. 8, petitioner’s exhibit 1, stock
certificate.) Nor is it disputed that Cheryl Gill’s shares have not been transferred or disposed of
in any manner. The stock certificate “incorporates Article VII of bylaws which governs sale
[and] disposal of shares.” The bylaws were not provided by either party. However, Article VII of
occupancy agreement states:
The Company and member each agrees not to sell, redeem, purchase, retire,
pledge, alienate or otherwise dispose of any stock of the Company without prior
written consent of the Housing and Redevelopment Board of The City of New
York. In the event said consent of the Housing and Redevelopment Board of
The City of New York has been obtained, then this Agreement, the Member's
right of occupancy and his stock in the Company shall be first offered to the
Company for the aggregate sum which the Member paid for said stock.

DISCUSSION
No certificate of eviction has issued as against Cheryl Gill on the basis that the apartment
is not her primary residence in violation of her occupancy agreement. There has been no final
determination as to Cheryl Gill’s primary residence made by either HPD or a court of competent
jurisdiction after appeal as against Cheryl Gill. Supreme court merely determined that HPD’s
failure to give succession rights to respondent was rational. To the extent that supreme court
discussed Cheryl Gill’s primary residence, it did so only in the context that respondent had not
demonstrated that she had lived with her mother for the requisite period as her primary residence
because she had failed to establish when her mother vacated the apartment. As stated in that
decision: “[HPD] determined that the petitioner failed to prove through sufficient, credible and
reliable evidence when her mother permanently vacated the apartment, and therefore, petitioner
failed to prove the required co-residency with the tenant to obtain succession rights (emphasis
added).” (NYSCEF Doc No. 14, petitioner’s exhibit 7, motion sequence 1 at 4.) Indeed, while
petitioner may well be able to prove that the subject premises is not Cheryl Gill’s primary
residence and that she cannot cure this breach, it has not yet done so. At the very least, there are
issues of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of petitioner. However, petitioner’s entire
cause of action falls on another ground.
It is not “implicit” as petitioner orally argued, that it can now proceed to housing court to
evict respondent as a licensee of Cheryl Gill without first properly obtaining possession as
against the shareholder. Any housing court proceeding against Cheryl Gill for eviction based on
non-primary residence would have to be predicated on a certificate of eviction for her eviction,
which, in turn, would have to be issued after finding at HPD that the subject premises was not
her primary residence. A license proceeding against respondent in housing court would require
petitioner to demonstrate that the “licensor is no longer entitled to possession of the property.”
(RPAPL 713 [7].)
As stated in Wong v Gouverneur Gardens Hous. Corp., 308 AD2d 301, 304–05 (1st Dept
2003):
“[The] New York City Rules and Regulations (City Rules) contain detailed
procedures for termination proceedings before HPD, mandating a
preliminary notice of grounds for eviction, an administrative hearing, an
issuance of a certificate of eviction if such grounds are upheld and the right
to review by way of a CPLR article 78 proceeding . . . . Additionally, under
the City Rules, cooperatives and landlords under the Mitchell–Lama program

are expressly prohibited from commencing an eviction proceeding based
upon a holdover or a breach of lease unless a certificate of eviction issued by
HPD is obtained (28 RCNY § 3–18[a]). It is obvious, therefore, that the
administrative scheme at issue in this case contemplates initial review by
HPD (see Sohn v. Calderon, 78 N.Y.2d 755, 767, 579 N.Y.S.2d 940, 587
N.E.2d 807 [instances where eviction proceedings may be commenced only
after agency-issued certificate of evictions, and where review is limited to
article 78 proceedings, evince a legislative intent to have such cases
determined by the agency in the first instance] (citations from the original).”
The court finds that not only is Cheryl Gill a necessary party to this proceeding, but also
that a licensee proceeding against Danielle Gill is improper until petitioner has possession of the
apartment from Cheryl Gill and the shares held by her which are allocated to that apartment.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent’s motion is GRANTED and this proceeding is dismissed for
failure to name a necessary party.
The court need not consider petitioner’s remaining arguments.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: August 1, 2022
New York, NY
____________________________
HON. KAREN MAY BACDAYAN
Judge, Housing Part

